Can We Learn Before History Repeats Itself?
An Open Letter to Everyone Committed to Protecting Children and Families
History rarely repeats itself exactly.
The laws change.
The institutions change.
Professional language changes.
The reasons given for intervention change.
And each generation quite reasonably believes that it understands things its predecessors did not.
So when we look back at historic forced adoption, we should resist the temptation to draw a straight line from yesterday to today.
The past is not the present.
But perhaps that is not the most important question.
The more difficult question is this:
If history does not repeat itself exactly, how do we recognise the parts of it that may return in another form?
A national apology gives us an unusual opportunity to ask that question.
We now look back at practices once shaped by powerful assumptions about unmarried motherhood, respectability, social conformity and what constituted a suitable family.
Today, many of those assumptions appear obviously unjust.
But they were not always experienced as obviously unjust by the institutions that relied upon them.
That should make us curious.
Not suspicious of everything.
Not cynical about every profession.
But curious about how a society comes to feel certain.
Because history does not usually arrive carrying a sign that says:
This will one day be regretted.
It arrives as ordinary practice.
As accepted language.
As professional judgment.
As policy.
As procedure.
Sometimes as compassion.
Sometimes as protection.
Sometimes as something so familiar that few people think to ask where its boundaries should lie.
This is why learning from history requires more than remembering its outcomes.
We need to understand its mechanisms.
How did a belief become normal?
How did normality become policy?
How did policy become professional practice?
How did professional practice become difficult to question?
And how did the experiences of those who disagreed become easier to dismiss than the certainty of the institutions deciding their lives?
These are historical questions.
But they are also questions every living institution should be willing to ask itself.
The lesson is not that today’s child protection system is simply historic forced adoption under another name.
That would erase important differences and weaken the very historical understanding we need.
Today’s system has different laws, safeguards, professional standards and concepts of children’s rights.
It operates in a different society.
But difference does not make historical learning unnecessary.
It makes historical learning more demanding.
Because the task is not to search for identical practices.
It is to recognise recurring human tendencies.
The tendency to confuse professional consensus with certainty.
The tendency to allow an administrative category to become a description of a whole person.
The tendency to believe that good intentions guarantee good outcomes.
The tendency to hear cooperation more readily than disagreement.
The tendency to treat challenge as resistance.
The tendency to focus so strongly on the danger of not acting that we give less attention to the consequences of acting.
None of these tendencies belongs to one profession or one historical period.
They belong to human institutions.
That is precisely why safeguards matter.
And perhaps this is where history can become practical.
Imagine if every institution with the power to alter a child’s family life routinely asked:
What assumptions are we making?
Which of those assumptions are facts, and which are predictions?
What evidence would cause us to change our view?
Have we genuinely heard the people who disagree with us?
What less irreversible options remain?
What might the long-term consequences of our intervention be?
These questions would not prevent professionals from acting.
They might help them act more carefully.
They would not make child protection weaker.
They might make its reasoning stronger.
There is also another lesson history offers us.
Those most affected by a system often recognise its consequences before the system itself does.
This does not mean every complaint is correct.
It does not mean every criticism should determine policy.
But it does mean that repeated experiences deserve curiosity rather than automatic dismissal.
When families describe the same difficulty again and again, listen.
When adults who experienced care, adoption or family separation as children describe consequences that were not anticipated, listen.
When professionals inside a system raise concerns about pressures or practices, listen.
When research challenges comfortable assumptions, listen.
Learning early depends upon hearing weak signals before they become historical evidence.
That may be one of the hardest things institutions are asked to do.
Institutions naturally create routines.
Routines create confidence.
Confidence makes action possible.
And action is necessary.
But confidence has a shadow.
Once a way of seeing becomes deeply embedded, contrary evidence can begin to look like an exception rather than information.
History can help protect us from that.
Not by telling us exactly what to do.
But by reminding us to leave a door open for the possibility that we may not yet understand everything.
That is not institutional weakness.
It is intellectual discipline.
And it matters especially where decisions may be irreversible.
A temporary decision can sometimes be corrected.
A permanent separation may be much harder to undo.
Years cannot always be returned.
Relationships cannot always be reconstructed.
A child’s understanding of family and belonging cannot simply be reset.
Where consequences are difficult to reverse, certainty should carry a corresponding responsibility for caution.
This brings us back to the question raised by the apology.
What does it mean to say that we have learned from history?
Surely it must mean more than being able to describe what previous generations did wrong.
Real historical learning occurs when knowledge of yesterday changes how we think today.
When it changes the questions we ask.
When it changes what evidence we notice.
When it makes disagreement easier to hear.
When it makes power more conscious of its limits.
And when it allows correction to happen sooner.
We cannot guarantee that future generations will agree with every decision we make.
No society can.
Nor can we build institutions that never make mistakes.
But perhaps we can build institutions that become better at noticing when their assumptions deserve another look.
History does not have to repeat itself exactly for its lessons to matter.
Sometimes the names change.
Sometimes the language changes.
Sometimes the institutions change.
What matters is whether our capacity to question ourselves changes too.
So perhaps the challenge after a national apology is not simply:
How do we make sure this exact history never happens again?
It is something broader:
How do we become better at recognising the conditions in which good intentions, institutional certainty and irreversible power can combine in ways that future generations may struggle to understand?
If we can ask that question while decisions are still being made, history has already begun to teach us earlier.
And perhaps that is how repetition is prevented.
Not by believing that the past will return unchanged.
But by learning to recognise its echoes before they become another history.
Su Qing